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Abstract
Non-additivity is one of the distinctive traits of Quantum Information Theory: the combined use of quan-
tum objects may be more advantageous than the sum of their individual uses. Non-additivity effects have
been proven, for example, for quantum channel capacities, entanglement distillation or state estimation.
In this work, we consider whether non-additivity effects can be found in Classical Information Theory.
We work in the secret-key agreement scenario in which two honest parties, having access to correlated
classical data that are also correlated to an eavesdropper, aim at distilling a secret key. Exploiting the
analogies between the entanglement and the secret-key agreement scenario, we provide some evidence
that the secret-key rate may be a non-additive quantity. In particular, we show that correlations with
conjectured bound information become secret-key distillable when combined. Our results constitute a
new instance of the subtle relation between the entanglement and secret-key agreement scenario.
Introduction
Classical communication systems are governed by classical information theory, a vast discipline whose
birth coincides with a seminal paper of Claude Shannon [1]. Among his contributions, Shannon intro-
duced the concept of channel capacity, which quantifies the maximum communication rate that can be
achieved over a classical channel. One key feature of the channel capacity is its additivity: the total
capacity of several channels used in parallel is simply given by the sum of their individual capacities.
This fact implies thus that the channel capacity completely specifies channel’s ability to convey classical
information.
Moving to the quantum domain, the quantum channel capacity captures the ability of a quantum
channel to transmit quantum information. Smith and Yard [2] proved recently that the quantum capacity
is not additive. In particular, they provide examples of two channels with zero quantum capacity that
define a channel with strictly positive quantum capacity when combined. This intriguing quantum effect
is known as activation and can generally be understood as follows: the combined use of quantum objects
can be more advantageous than the sum of their individual uses. In the last years, an intense effort
has been devoted to the study of non-additivity effects in Quantum Information Theory. Classical and
private communication capacity of quantum channels were later shown not to be additive in Refs [3, 4].
Nowadays, non-additivity is considered to be one of the distinctive traits of Quantum Information Theory.
Before the results by Smith and Yard, however, non-additivity effects had also been observed in
Entanglement Theory in the context of entanglement distillation. There, one is interested in the problem
of whether pure-state entanglement –pure entanglement in what follows– can be extracted from a given
state shared by several observers using local operations and classical communication (LOCC). In Ref. [5],
the authors provide examples of multipartite states that (i) are non-distillable (bound) when considered
separately but (ii) define a distillable state when taken together. Moving to the case of two parties, and
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leaving aside activation-like results as those of [6], it remains unproven whether entangled states can be
activated. There is however some evidence of the existence of pairs of bound (non-distillable) entangled
states that give a distillable state when combined [7, 8].
In this work we are interested in the question of whether non-additivity effects can be observed
in Classical Information Theory. As mentioned, classical channel capacities are known to be additive.
Therefore, we move our considerations to distillation scenarios. In particular, we focus on the classical
secret-key agreement scenario in which two honest parties, having access to correlated random vari-
ables, also correlated with an adversary, aim at establishing a secret key by local operations and public
communication (LOPC). While the activation of classical resources has been shown in a multipartite
key-agreement scenario in [9, 10], here we consider the more natural case of two honest parties. In
our study, we exploit the analogies between the secret-key agreement and entanglement scenario noted
in [11]. Based on the results of [8], we provide evidence that activation effects may be possible in the
completely classical bipartite key-agrement scenario. Our findings, therefore, suggest that the classical
secret-key rate is non-additive.
This article is structured as follows: Section 1 contains a brief introduction to the entanglement and
the secret-key agreement scenario. After pointing out the analogies between the two scenarios, our main
results are derived in section 2. Section 3 concludes with a discussion of how our findings are related to
other results and conjectures in the field.
1 Entanglement vs secret correlations
The aim of this section is to introduce the entanglement and secret-key agreement scenario. As first
noted in [12], there are several analogies between these two scenarios despite the fact that they involve
objects of different nature, namely entangled quantum states vs classical joint probability distributions.
These analogies play a key role in the derivation of our results in the next section.
1.1 Entanglement scenario
A maximally entangled state of two qubits represents the most representative example of a bipartite
entangled state and is an essential ingredient in many applications of quantum information theory [13].
It is defined as:
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣00〉+ ∣∣11〉)
AB
(1)
The relevance of this state for communication purposes is due essentially to two main facts: first, for
each projective measurement by one of the observers, there exists another measurement by the other
observer giving perfectly correlated results. Second, being a pure state, no third party can be correlated
with it. State (1) represents the basic unit of entanglement and is also known as ebit, for entangled bit.
This is because an asymptotically large number of copies of an arbitrary pure entangled state can be
converted into another asymptotically large number of ebits in a reversible way [14].
In any realistic situation, quantum states are affected by noise. In the case of a composite system
shared by two observers, Alice and Bob (also A and B), the ideal pure entangled states is mapped into
a mixed state ρAB . Any noise can be modeled as interaction with an environment, E, as any state can
be seen as the trace of a pure state on a sufficiently large environment. In the bipartite case considered
here one has ρAB = trE |ψABE〉〈ψABE |. Of course, the interaction with the environment deteriorates the
entanglement present in the state. Thus, given a generic quantum state ρAB , or equivalently the whole
tripartite state |ψABE〉, quantifying the entanglement between A and B is a fundamental question.
Two quantifiers play a crucial role because of their operational meaning: the entanglement cost and
the entanglement of distillation. Both quantities are defined in the asymptotic scenario consisting of
an asymptotically large number of identical copies of the state. The entanglement cost [15], denoted
by Ec, quantifies the number of ebits per copy needed for the formation of the given quantum state
by LOCC. The entanglement of distillation [16], denoted by ED, indicates the amount of ebits per
copy that can be obtained from it by LOCC. For a state ρAB , Ec(ρAB) > 0 implies that the state is
entangled, while ED(ρAB) > 0 indicates that some pure entanglement can be extracted from it. Clearly,
it holds that Ec ≥ ED, as one cannot extract from a state more entanglement than needed for its
preparation. Interestingly, there are states that display an intriguing form of irreversibility: despite
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having a positive entanglement cost (Ec > 0), they are non-distillable (ED = 0). These states are called
bound entangled [17]. Consequently, the whole set of entangled states is composed of distillable, or free
entangled states, and bound entangled states.
Detecting whether a given state is non-distillable is in principle a very hard question, as one has to
prove that no LOCC protocol acting on an arbitrary number of copies of the state is able to extract any
pure entanglement. However, a very useful result derived in [17] shows that a quantum state that remains
Positive under Partial Transposition [18] (PPT) is non-distillable. Whether Non-Positivity of the Partial
Transposition, or Negative Partial Transposition (NPT), is sufficient for entanglement distillability is
probably the main open question at the moment in Entanglement Theory. Evidence [19, 20] has been
given for the existence of NPT states that are bound entangled (see however [21]). Note that the existence
of these states would imply that the set of non-distillable states is not convex and that entanglement of
distillation is non-additive [7]. A necessary and sufficient condition for the distillability of a quantum
state is provided by the following
Theorem 1. A state ρ acting on H = HA ⊗HB is distillable if and only if there exist a finite integer
number n ≥ 1 and two dimensional projectors P : H⊗nA → C2 and Q : H⊗nB → C2 such that the state
ρ′ = (P ⊗Q)ρ⊗n(P ⊗Q)† (2)
is entangled.
Actually, since the resulting state acts on C2 ⊗ C2, this is equivalent to demand that ρ′ is NPT, as
this condition is necessary and sufficient for entanglement in the two-qubit case [22]. Furthermore, it is
worth mentioning here that, if such a projector exists for some number k of copies, the state is said to
be k − distillable.
1.2 Secret-key agreement scenario
The main scope of this section is to introduce the secret-key agreement scenario. This scenario consists
of two honest parties, again Alice and Bob, who have access to correlated information, described by
two random variables X and Y . These variables are also correlated to a third random variable Z that
belongs to an adversarial party, the eavesdropper Eve, denoted by E. All the correlations among the
three parties are described by the probability distribution P (XY Z). The honest parties aim at mapping
the initial correlations into a secret key by LOPC, which is the natural set of operations between the
honest parties.
Similar questions as above can be addressed in this completely classical scenario. The classical
equivalent of a maximally entangled state is a secret bit. A and B share perfect secret bits whenever
P (XY Z) is such that the eavesdropper is factored out, P (XY ) × P (Z), and their variables can take
two possible values, X,Y = 0, 1, that are perfectly correlated and random, P (X = Y = 0) = P (X =
Y = 1) = 1/2. Similarly as above, given some initial correlations, the goal is to quantify its secrecy
content. The classical analog of Ec is the information of formation, denoted by If [23]. It is said that the
probability distribution P (XY Z) contains secret correlations (or secret bits) whenever If (P (XY Z)) > 0.
For distillation, the natural classical analog is the secret-key rate [24], denoted by S(X : Y ‖Z), which
quantifies the number of secret bits that can be distilled from given correlations by LOPC. Due to the
difficulty of computing the previous quantities, it is useful to establish bounds on them. The intrinsic
information [24], I(X;Y ↓ Z), provides a lower bound to the information of formation [23] and an upper
bound to the secret-key rate [24]:
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ I(X;Y ↓ Z) ≤ If (X;Y |Z) (3)
It is defined as the minimal mutual information between A and B conditioned on E over all possible
maps Z → Z¯ the eavesdropper can perform, that is,
I(X;Y ↓ Z) := min
PZ|Z
[
I(X;Y |Z) : PXY Z =
∑
z
PXY Z · PZ|Z
]
(4)
In Ref [25] it was shown that it is sufficient to consider the output alphabet Z¯ of the same size as the
input alphabet Z.
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A main open question in this scenario is whether there exist non-distillable secret correlations with
strictly positive information of formation. These correlations are named bound information, as they would
constitute a classical cryptographic analog of bound entanglement [12]. Compared to the entanglement
scenario, identifying a single example of non-distillable correlations is much harder, due to the lack
of a simple mathematical criterion, as Partial Transposition, to detect it. In a multipartite scenario,
say of three honest parties plus an eavesdropper, the possibility of splitting the honest parties into
different bipartitions hugely simplifies the problem and, indeed, there are examples of correlations that
require secret bits for the preparation and from which no secret bits can be extracted [9]. The problem
remains open for two honest parties, although evidence has been provided for the existence of bound
information [12].
When studying the distillation properties of some given correlations, one usually employs Advantage
Distillation (AD) protocols. These protocols were first introduced by Maurer [26] to show how two honest
parties may be able to extract a secret key even in cases in which Bob has less information than Eve
about Alice’s symbols. Crucial to achieve this task is feedback, that is, two way communication between
the honest parties. The general structure of an AD protocol is as follows [27] (without loss of generality
we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s variables have the same size d): Alice first generates randomly a value
ζ. She chooses a vector of N symbols from her string of data, a = (a1, . . . , aN ), and publicly announces
their positions to Bob. Later she sends him the N -dimensional vector a¯ whose components a¯k are such
that ak ⊕ a¯k = ζ holds ∀k. Here, ⊕ is the sum modulo d. Bob sums a¯ to his corresponding symbols. If
he obtains always the same value χ, then he accepts (this means that with very high probability χ = ζ)
otherwise both discard the N symbols. Although its yield is very low with increasing N , AD protocols
allow the honest parties to distill a key even in a priori disadvantageous situations in which Eve has
more information than Bob on Alice’s symbols. Such protocols are used in what follows to estimate the
distillability properties of correlations. Obviously, the fact that we are unable to map some correlations
into a secret key by AD protocols does not mean that these correlations are non-distillable. At best, it
can be interpreted as some evidence of bound information.
Finally, another concept used in the sequel is that of binaryzation, which can be understood as the
classical analog of the quantum projection onto 2-qubit subspaces used in Theorem 1. As in the quantum
case, Alice and Bob agree on two possible values, not necessarily the same, and discard all instances in
which their random variables take different values. Then, they project their initial distribution onto a
smaller (and usually simpler) two-bit distribution.
1.3 From Quantum States to Classsical Probabilities
It is clear from the previous discussion that the entanglement and secret-key agreement scenarios have a
similar formulation. One can go further and establish connections between the entanglement of bipartite
quantum states and the tripartite probability distributions that can be derived from them [12]. Not
surprisingly, the transition from quantum states to classical probabilities is through measurements (on
the quantum states). Note also that, while in the quantum case the state between Alice and Bob also
specifies the correlations with the environment, possibly under control of the eavesdropper, in the classical
cryptographic scenario it is essential to define the correlations with the eavesdropper for the problem to
be meaningful.
As mentioned, if Alice and Bob share a state ρAB , the natural way of including Eve is to assume that
she owns a purification of it. In this way the global state of the three parties is a pure tripartite
∣∣ψABE〉
such that ρAB = trE
(∣∣ψABE〉〈ψABE∣∣). After this purification, measurements by the three parties, MX ,
MY and MZ , respectively, map the state into a tripartite probability distribution:
P (XY Z) = tr
(
MX ⊗MY ⊗MZ
∣∣ψABE〉〈ψABE∣∣) (5)
It has been shown that (i) if the initial quantum state is separable, there exists a measurement by the
eavesdropper such that the probability distribution (5) has zero intrinsic information for all measurements
by Alice and Bob [12, 28] and also zero information of formation [29] and (ii) if the initial state is
entangled, there exist measurements by Alice and Bob such that the probability distributions (5) has
strictly positive intrinsic information for all measurements by Eve [29].
Concerning the cryptographic classical analog of bound entanglement, bound information was first
conjectured in Ref. [11]. There, local measurements were applied to known examples of bound entangled
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states. It was then shown that the resulting tripartite probability distributions have positive intrinsic
information but no known protocol allows the honest parties to distill a secret key. Of course, this does
not mean that the distribution is non-distillable. Note however that the existence, and activation, of
bound information was proven in a multipartite scenario consisting of three honest parties, plus the
eavesdropper, in Ref. [9] (see also [10]). The examples of multipartite bound information given in these
works were derived from existing multi-qubit bound entangled states.
2 Is the secret-key rate a non-additive quantity?
This section presents our main results. Exploiting the analogies between the entanglement and secret-
key agreement scenarios, we study whether it is possible to derive a cryptographic classical analog of the
activation of distillable entanglement between bipartite quantum states given in Ref. [8]. This result is
reviewed in the following section. We then map the involved quantum states onto probability distributions
and study their secrecy properties. After applying classical distillation protocols, we show how the honest
parties are able to distill a secret key from each of the distributions for the same range of parameters as
in the quantum regime (ED > 0). Finally, we introduce a distillation protocol analogue to the one used
for the quantum activation. We prove that this protocol activates probability distributions containing
conjectured bound information, although we cannot completely recover the quantum region.
2.1 Quantum Activation
As mentioned, we start by presenting the example of activation of distillable entanglement given in
Ref. [8]. After introducing the states involved in this example, we review their distillability properties
and the quantum protocol that attains the activation.
2.1.1 Quantum States
States that are invariant under a group of symmetries play a relevant role in the study of entanglement.
The two classes of symmetric states considered here are Werner states [30] and the symmetric states of
Ref. [31, 8], named in what follows symmetric states for the sake of brevity.
Werner States. Acting on an Hilbert spaceH = HA⊗HB with dimensions dim(HA) = dim(HB) =
d, and commuting with all unitaries U ⊗ U , Werner states can be expressed as:
ρW (p) = p
Ad
tr(Ad) + (1− p)
Sd
tr(Sd) (6)
where Ad = (1 − Πd)/2, Sd = (1 + Πd)/2 are the projector operators onto the antisymmetric and
symmetric subspaces, Πd is the flip operator and tr(Ad) = d(d − 1)/2, tr(Sd) = d(d + 1)/2. It is
known that states (6) are entangled and NPT iff p > ps = 1/2. Moreover they are distillable, actually
1 − distillable, if p > p1d = 3τ/(1 + 3τ), where τ = tr(Ad)/tr(Sd). The states are conjectured to be
bound entangled for ps < p ≤ p1d.
Symmetric States. Acting on an Hilbert space H = HA1 ⊗ HA2 ⊗ HB1 ⊗ HB2, the symmetric
states under consideration commute with all unitaries of the form W = (U ⊗ V )A ⊗ (U ⊗ V ∗)B (where
V ∗ is the complex conjugate of V ). These states can be represented in a compact form as [32]:
σ =
4∑
i=1
λiPi/tr[Pi]
where P1 = A(1)d ⊗P(2)d , P2 = S(1)d ⊗P(2)d , P3 = A(1)d ⊗(1− Pd)(2), P4 = S(1)d ⊗(1− Pd)(2). Pd and 1−Pd
represent the projector onto the maximally entangled state |ψ+d 〉 = 1/
√
d
∑d
i=1 |ii〉, and its orthogonal
complement, respectively. In Ref. [8] the authors identify a region in the space of parameters λi so that
the state σ (i) is bound entangled but (ii) gives a distillable state when combined with a Werner state
in the conjectured region of bound entanglement. Among all the states with these properties, we focus
here on:
σ(q) = q
Ad
tr(Ad) ⊗ Pd + (1− q)
Sd
tr(Sd) ⊗
(1− Pd)
tr(1− Pd) (7)
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where q = 1/(d+2). This state is a universal activator, in the sense that it defines a distillable state when
combined with any entangled Werner state. It is also relevant for what follows to study the distillability
properties of states (7) for any value of q and d = 3. These states are NPT and 1-distillable for q > 1/5.
The latter follows from the fact that in this region, there exist local projections on two-qubit subspaces
mapping states (7) onto an entangled two-qubit state. The qubit subspaces are spanned by |00〉, |01〉
on Alice’s side and |10〉, |11〉 on Bob’s. Figure 1 summarizes the main entanglement properties of these
states.
Figure 1: Entanglement properties of Werner, ρW , and symmetric state, σ(q), for the qutrit case (d = 3). In the region
between separability and 1-distillability, ρW is NPPT and conjectured bound. The point q = 0.2 represents the extremal
value for which states σ(q) are PPT, thus not distillable. For larger values of q the states are distillable (in particular,
1-distillable).
2.1.2 Protocol for Quantum Activation
As already announced, any entangled Werner state, and in particular any conjectured bound entangled
Werner state, gives a distillable state when combined with the universal activator σ(q) with q = 1/(d+2),
simply denoted as σ. If initially the two parties are sharing a Werner state ρ acting on H0 = HA0 ⊗HB0
and a symmetric state σ acting on H1,2 = HA1 ⊗ HA2 ⊗ HB1 ⊗ HB2 , each party applies a projection
onto a maximally entangled states on HA0 ⊗HA1 and HB0 ⊗HB1 respectively. The resulting state is an
isotropic state ρiso acting on HA2 ⊗HB2 . Recall that isotropic state are U ⊗ U∗ invariant and defined
by the convex combination of a maximally entangled state and white noise, I /d2. One can see that the
resulting isotropic state has an overlap with a maximally entangled state, tr(ρisoPd), larger than 1/d for
any entangled Werner state. As shown in [33], this condition is sufficient for distillability.
2.2 Classical Activation
This section contains the main results of our work. Our goal is to construct a classical cryptographic
analog of the quantum activation example discussed above.
We first associate probability distributions to all the previous quantum states. In order to do so, we
purify the initial bipartite noisy quantum states ρAB by including an environment, and then map the
tripartite quantum states |ψABE〉 onto probability distributions by performing some local measurements,
see (5). The procedure to choose these measurements is always the same: computational bases for the
honest parties, and general measurements for Eve. More precisely, denoting by X and Y the result
obtained by Alice and Bob, this effectively projects Eve’s system onto the pure state |eXY 〉 = 〈XY |ψABE〉
with probability P (XY ) = 〈XY |ρAB |XY 〉. Given that, the measurement that Eve applies is the one
that minimizes her error probability when distinguishing the states in the ensemble {|eXY 〉, P (XY )}.
Note that this choice of measurement may not necessarily be optimal from Eve’s point of view in terms
of the secret correlations between Alice and Bob, but it seems a natural choice. This procedure is applied
to the two family of states, namely Werner and symmetric. Because of the symmetries of these states,
the measurements minimizing Eve’s error probability can be analytically determined using the results of
Refs [34, 35].
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In order to characterize the secrecy properties of the obtained probability distributions, we compute
the intrinsic information when numerically possible and use AD protocols for distillability. We stress
that the considered protocols distill a secret key in the same region of parameters in which entanglement
distillation was possible for the initial quantum states. Finally, we introduce a quantum-like activation
protocol that maps the two probability distributions into a new distribution in which Alice and Bob
each have a bit. We then prove that an AD protocol allows distilling a secret key for some value of the
parameters in which the initial quantum states were non-distillable. However, we are unable to close all
the gap between entanglement and 1-distillability for the Werner state.
2.2.1 Probability Distributions
Werner states distribution. We start by mapping the Werner states of two qutrits onto a probability
distribution PXY Z following the recipe explained in the previous section. In this way, we get a one-
parameter family of probability distributions PXY Z , (see Table 1 for details), which depends just on the
same parameter p defining the initial Werner state (6). The resulting distributions are given in Table 1.
The indices for Eve’s symbols specify her guess on Alice’s and Bob’s symbols or, in other words, if Eve
outcome is Z = zij , the most probable outcomes for Alice and Bob are X = i and Y = j.
0 1 2
0 λ1 (z00)
λ1+λ2
2
{
δZ (z10)
1− δZ (z01)
λ1+λ2
2
{
δZ (z20)
1− δZ (z02)
1 λ1+λ22
{
δZ (z01)
1− δZ (z10)
λ1 (z11)
λ1+λ2
2
{
δZ (z21)
1− δZ (z12)
2 λ1+λ22
{
δZ (z02)
1− δZ (z20)
λ1+λ2
2
{
δZ (z12)
1− δZ (z21)
λ1 (z22)
Table 1: Tripartite probability distributions derived from Werner states (6). The parameters in the table are as follows:
λ1 = (1− p)/6, λ2 = p/3 and δZ = (
√
λ1 −
√
λ2)2/(2(λ1 + λ2)). Rows (columns) represent Alice’s (Bob’s) symbols. Eve’s
symbols are shown in parenthesis. For example, the cell (X = 0, Y = 1) shows that whenever Alice and Bob get (0,1)
(which happen with probability (λ1 + λ2)/2), Eve correctly guesses the symbol z01 with probability 1− δZ , and makes an
error (symbol z10) with probability δZ .
As done for entanglement, we now characterize these distributions in terms of their secret correlations.
Recall that for the quantum case and qutrits, the state was entangled for p > ps = 1/2 and conjectured
non-distillable for p ≤ p1d = 3/5. As we show next, the same values appear for the analogous classical
distributions. Concerning the point ps, we compute the intrinsic information of the distributions in
Table 1 by numerical optimization over all possible channels by Eve. Of course, one can never exclude
the existence of local minima and, therefore, that the intrinsic information is strictly smaller than what
numerically obtained. One may wonder why this computation is necessary. For instance, at the point
p = ps the quantum state is separable and, then, it is known that there exists a measurement by Eve
such that the intrinsic information between Alice and Bob is zero for all measurements. Note however
that in terms of intrinsic information, the optimal measurement by Eve is the one that prepares on Alice
and Bob the ensemble of product states compatible with the separable state Alice and Bob share. This
measurement is not necessarily the same as the one minimizing Eve’s error probability when Alice and
Bob measure in the computational bases. The same applies to the entanglement region. While there
are measurements such that Alice and Bob share secret correlations no matter which measurement Eve
performs, these measurements are not on the computational bases.
Using the numerical insight, we find a conjectured optimal channel that reproduces the numerical
results. The optimal channel gives zero intrinsic information exactly at the point p = ps. It maps Eve’s
symbols zii onto zij with i 6= j with equal probability (i, j = 0, 1, 2). Its easy form leads to the following
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analytical expression for I(X;Y ↓ Z):
I(X;Y ↓ Z) = − log(1− x2)− x log
(
1 + x
1− x
√
τ − 2x
τ + 2x
)
+
τ
4
log (τ2 − 4x2) +
(
1− τ
2
)
log(2− τ)
where τ = 1 + p, x =
√
2p(1− p). Figure 2 shows the behavior of this quantity in the region of interest.
Figure 2: Behaviour of the intrinsic information for the PXY Z relative to the Werner state. Note that: i) I(X;Y ↓ Z)
is equal to 0 at point p = 0.5 which corresponds to the last point of separability for the Werner state; ii) I(X;Y ↓ Z) is
strictly positive at point p = 0.6 which corresponds to the extreme value of p for which it is 1-copy distillable.
Moving to the distillability properties, we study AD protocols and identify a value of p for which
positive secret-key rate can be obtained by the two honest parties through these protocols. The considered
protocol is the quantum analogue of the quantum one and uses a binaryzation. Alice and Bob first discard
one (but the same) of their symbols. Then, one of the parties, say Bob, applies a local permutation to
his symbols. For example, if they agreed on discarding symbol 2, then Bob applies 0 ↔ 1. Alice and
Bob now apply AD to the resulting two-bit distribution. This distribution is shown in Table 2.
From the obtained table, it is possible to estimate the dependence of Bob’s and Eve’s errors on the
size of the blocks used for AD, denoted by N . Recall that in the case of bits the protocols works as
follows: Alice generates a random bit ζ and chooses N symbols a from her list of data. She then sends
to Bob the information about these symbols and the vector a¯ such that ai ⊕ a¯i = ζ,∀i. Bob takes the
symbols in his list corresponding to those chosen by Alice, b, and accepts only when χ = bi ⊕ a¯i,∀i.
Bob’s error probability βN is now easy to compute. Denote by β the error probability in the initial
two-bit probability distribution, β = P (X 6= Y ) = 2λ1/(3λ1 +λ2). Bob accepts a bit whenever either all
his N symbols are identical to those of Alice, which happens with probability (1−β)N , or all his symbols
are different, whose probability is βN . Thus, the probability of accepting a wrong bit conditioned on
acceptance is given by:
βN =
βN
βN + (1− β)N 6
(
β
1− β
)N
. (8)
The upper bound becomes tight in the limit N →∞.
We now move to the estimation of Eve’s error N . As her information is probabilistic, there is always
a non-zero probability that she makes a mistake. For the estimation we compute a lower bound on the
error given by all the cases in which the N symbols observed by Eve do not provide her any information
about the value of the bit generated by Alice. In the computation, it is simpler to use Eve’s probabilities
conditioned on the fact that Alice and Bob have made no mistake after AD (which means that no mistake
has occurred for any of the N symbols). Or in other words, we only consider the terms in the diagonal
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0 1
0 λ1+λ22
{
δZ (z11)
1− δZ (z00)
λ1 (z01)
1 λ1 (z10)
λ1+λ2
2
{
δZ (z00)
1− δZ (z11)
Table 2: Two-bit distribution resulting from projecting the initial distribution of Table 1 on the space X,Y = 0, 1 and
after Bob permutes his symbol. For the sake of clarity, we apply a permutation also on the second index of Eve’s symbols,
that is zij → zi1−j . All the terms in the table should be normalized by a factor 3λ1 + λ2.
of Table 2. This does not make any difference for what follows as in the limit N →∞ the probability of
Bob accepting a wrong symbol goes to zero. After Bob’s acceptance, Eve knows that the actual string a
used by Alice is either equal to a¯ (the one sent on the public channel) when ζ = 0, or a¯′ (the permuted
one, that is, a¯′i = 1 − a¯i) when ζ = 1. Clearly, all the events in which the N symbols observed by Eve,
Z(i), are such that P (Z(1).. Z(N)|a = a¯) = P (Z(1).. Z(N)|a = a¯′) do not give her any information about
ζ. In these cases, Eve has to randomly guess Alice’s symbol and makes an error with probability 1/2.
Due to the symmetry in the diagonal of Table 2, that is, P (Z = z00|X = 0) = P (Z = z11 = 1|X = 1)
and P (Z = z11|X = 0) = P (Z = z00|X = 1), all the events where Eve has exactly N/2 of her symbols
equal to z00 and N/2 equal to z11 satisfy the previous condition and, thus, contribute to her error.
Counting all the possible ways of distributing these cases leads to the following lower bound on Eve’s
error probability [36]:
N >
1
2
(
N
N/2
)
δ
N/2
Z (1− δZ)N/2 (9)
where δZ is the probability for Eve to guess wrongly conditioned on those cases in which Alice and Bob’s
symbols coincide (this value is made explicit in the caption of Figure 1). The asymptotic behavior of
(9), after applying the Stirling’s approximation (n!)2 ' (2n)!/22n and expanding the binomial coefficient
can be expressed as:
N > c(2
√
δZ(1− δZ))N , (10)
with c being a positive constant.
By comparing Eqs. (8) and (10) one concludes that whenever
β
1− β < 2
√
δZ(1− δZ) (11)
key distillation is possible. This follows from the fact that, if this condition holds, Bob’s error is ex-
ponentially smaller than Eve’s with N . This in turn implies that it is possible to choose a value of N
such that Alice-Bob mutual information is larger than Alice-Eve and one-way distillation techniques can
distill a secret key. From (10) one gets that AD works whenever p > 3/5, as for 1-distillability in the
quantum case. Before concluding this part, we would like to mention that the same range of parameters
for distillation is obtained if one applies the generalized AD protocol of Ref. [27].
Symmetric states distribution. We apply the same machinery to the symmetric states σ(q).
Again, the symmetries of the states allow the explicit computation of the measurement by Eve minimizing
her error probability for any value of q. The obtained distributions, denoted by QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ , is
significantly more complex and shown in Appendix A. It consists of two trits for Alice, (X1, X2) and two
trits for Bob, (X2, Y2), while Eve’s variable can take 63 possible values. It is now much harder to estimate
the secrecy properties of the distribution. For instance, we did not make any attempt to compute the
intrinsic information. However, we are able to show that Alice and Bob can distill a secret key whenever
q > 1/5 as in the quantum regime.
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To simplify our task, we exploit again the concept of binaryzation. Inspired by the quantum projec-
tions used for the distillation of σ(q), Alice and Bob select two outcomes on each side, namely 00, 01 for
Alice and 10, 11 for Bob. The obtained two-bit distribution is shown in Table 3.
0 [10] 1 [11]
0 [00] 1+7q5+11q

PG (z˜0100)
PL (z˜0111)
PL (z˜0122)
PB (z˜1000)
PH (z˜1011)
PH (z˜1022)
3(1−q)
2(5+11q)
{
1/2 (z˜0101)
1/2 (z˜1001)
1 [01] 3(1−q)2(5+11q)
{
1/2 (z˜0110)
1/2 (z˜1010)
1+7q
5+11q

PL (z˜0100)
PG (z˜0111)
PL (z˜0122)
PH (z˜1000)
PB (z˜1011)
PH (z˜1022)
Table 3: Two-bit distribution obtained as a result of the binaryzation applied to QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ . Note that we have
relabeled the old symbols (shown in square brakets) by 0 and 1, in the following we use X˜, Y˜ to refer to them. The parameters
in the table are as follows: α =
√
8q/(1 + 7q) and γ =
√
(1− q)/(2(1 + 7q)), PG = (α + 2γ)2/6, PB = (−α + 2γ)2/6,
PL = (α− γ)2/6, PH = (α+ γ)2/6.
They apply the standard bit AD protocol to this distribution. As before, Bob’s error can be easily
computed, getting the same as in Eq. (8), but now with β equal to 3(1− q)/(5 + 11q). The estimation of
Eve’s error is much more cumbersome. As above, the main idea is to derive a lower bound on it based
on those instances in which Eve’s symbols do not provide her any information about the symbol ζ Alice
used for AD. Again, one can restrict the analysis to the terms in the diagonal of Table 3. The main
difference in comparison with the simple case discussed above is the larger number of symbols for Eve.
However, given the symmetry of the distribution 3 it is enough to consider Eve’s symbols pair-wise:
P (Z˜ = z˜0100|X˜Y˜ = 00) = P (Z˜ = z˜0111|X˜Y˜ = 11) = δ¯1
P (Z˜ = z˜0100|X˜Y˜ = 11) = P (Z˜ = z˜0111|X˜Y˜ = 00) = η¯1
P (Z˜ = z˜1000|X˜Y˜ = 00) = P (Z˜ = z˜1011|X˜Y˜ = 11) = δ¯2
P (Z˜ = z˜1000|X˜Y˜ = 11) = P (Z˜ = z˜1011|X˜Y˜ = 00) = η¯2
where we have used X˜, Y˜ to denote the re-labeling of Alice and Bob’s symbols. Note that the last
two subindexes of Eve’s symbols are those that give her information about Alice’s (and Bob’s) symbol.
Symbols z˜∗∗22 give her no information about Alice’s symbols, so we sum them, their total probability
being δ3. Given the public string a¯N , one can see that all those cases for which Eve has the same number
n1 of z˜0100 and z˜0111 and the same number n2 of z˜1000 and z˜1011, with N = 2n1 + 2n2 + 2n3 and where
2n3 is the total number of symbols z˜∗∗22, contribute to her error. Thus, counting all these cases leads to
the following lower bound on Eve’s error:
N >
1
2
∑
n1,n2,n3
N !
(2n1)!(2n2)!(2n3)!
(
2
√
δ1η1
)2n1 (
2
√
δ2η2
)2n2
(δ3)
2n3 (12)
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where δi and ηi are the probabilities shown above but normalized (since as already stated we are consid-
ering the asymptotic case). After Stirling’s approximation and summing eq. (12) the following compact
form is obtained:
N > c
(
2
√
δ1η1 + 2
√
δ2η2 + δ3
)N
with c being a positive constant. Comparing the scaling of the errors, one has that AD works whenever
β
1− β < 2
√
δ1η1 + 2
√
δ2η2 + δ3 (13)
where the right hand side is equal to (α + γ)2/3 (the values of α and γ are reported in the caption of
Table 3). Eq. (13) is hence satisfied whenever q > q˜ = 0.2, as announced.
2.2.2 Protocol for Classsical Activation
Inspired by the quantum activation example of Ref. [8], we consider the following classical protocol.
Alice and Bob have access to the trits X and Y , whose correlations are described by PXY Z , and the two
trits (X1, X2) and (Y1, Y2) correlated according to QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ . Alice (Bob) keeps X2 (Y2), and only
X2 (Y2), whenever X = X1 (Y = Y1); otherwise they discard all the symbols. This filtering projects
the initial probability into a slightly simpler two-trit distribution. The new probability distribution
Q∗(X2, Y2, E) reads:
Q∗(X2, Y2, E) =
2∑
x,y=0
P (X = x, Y = y, Z)Q(X1 = x, Y1 = y,X2, Y2, Z˜) (14)
where E = [Z, Z˜] is the collection of Eve’s ymbols. Finally Alice and Bob binaryze their symbols by
discarding one of the three values (the same for both), say 2. The resulting distribution is shown in
Table 4.
As above, we use AD protocols to estimate the value of p for which Alice and Bob can extract a
positive secret key rate if they are sharing pairs of bits distributed according to Table 4. We are able to
prove that whenever p > pc ' 0.513 an AD protocol allows distilling a secret key from the distribution in
Table 4 and, thus, a form of activation is possible. Unfortunately, we are unable to reach the point p = 0.5,
as in the quantum scenario. However, our analysis suggests that the secret key rate is non-additive for
some values of p. In the following we summarize the key steps leading to this result.
Figure 3: The CAD protocol certifies that if the Werner state distribution (Table 1) is taken with p > 0.513 positive
secrecy can be extracted by the honest parties. Unfortunately, we cannot completely close the gap up to p = 0.5. This
would have shown a direct correspondence between the quantum and the classical scenario.
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0 1
0
λ1(1−q)
72cN

2/3 (zii, z˜ii00)
1/6 (zii, z˜ii11)
1/6 (zii, z˜ii22)
λ1(1−q)
48cN

1 (z00, z˜0001)
1 (z11, z˜1101)
1 (z22, z˜2201)
(λ1+λ2)sN
2

δZPG + (1− δZ)PB (zts, z˜st00)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zts, z˜st11)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zts, z˜st22)
δZPB + (1− δZ)PG (zts, z˜ts00)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zts, z˜ts11)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zts, z˜ts22)
δZPB + (1− δZ)PG (zst, z˜st00)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zst, z˜st11)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zst, z˜st22)
δZPG + (1− δZ)PB (zst, z˜ts00)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zst, z˜ts11)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zst, z˜ts22)
(λ1+λ2)(1−q)
192cN

1/2 (z01, z˜0101)
1/2 (z01, z˜1001)
1/2 (z10, z˜0101)
1/2 (z10, z˜1001)
1/2 (z02, z˜0201)
1/2 (z02, z˜2001)
1/2 (z20, z˜0201)
1/2 (z20, z˜2001)
1/2 (z12, z˜1201)
1/2 (z12, z˜2101)
1/2 (z21, z˜1201)
1/2 (z21, z˜2101)
1
λ1(1−q)
48cN

1 (z00, z˜0010)
1 (z11, z˜1110)
1 (z22, z˜2210)
λ1(1−q)
72cN

1/6 (zii, z˜ii00)
2/3 (zii, z˜ii11)
1/6 (zii, z˜ii22)
(λ1+λ2)(1−q)
192cN

1/2 (z01, z˜0110)
1/2 (z01, z˜1010)
1/2 (z10, z˜0110)
1/2 (z10, z˜1010)
1/2 (z02, z˜0210)
1/2 (z02, z˜2010)
1/2 (z20, z˜0210)
1/2 (z20, z˜2010)
1/2 (z12, z˜1210)
1/2 (z12, z˜2110)
1/2 (z21, z˜1210)
1/2 (z21, z˜2110)
(λ1+λ2)sN
2

δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zts, z˜st00)
δZPG + (1− δZ)PB (zts, z˜st11)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zts, z˜st22)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zts, z˜ts00)
δZPB + (1− δZ)PG (zts, z˜ts11)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zts, z˜ts22)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zst, z˜st00)
δZPB + (1− δZ)PG (zst, z˜st11)
δZPH + (1− δZ)PL (zst, z˜st22)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zst, z˜ts00)
δZPG + (1− δZ)PB (zst, z˜ts11)
δZPL + (1− δZ)PH (zst, z˜ts22)
Table 4: Resulting tripartite distribution after the application of the classical protocol by the two honest parties. The
initial probability distributions PXY Z and QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ are mapped to the new probability distribution Q
∗(X2, Y2, E)
shown above. From this classical object we can derive the minimum value of p for which positive secret key can be extracted
by A and B. The parameters that appear above are expressed as a function of p and q, the two key parameters in the
initial probability distributions. cN = (λ1 + λ2)(5 + 11q)/48 + 5λ1(1− q)/24, sN = (1 + 7q)/(144cN ), i, s, t = 0, 1, 2 with
s 6= t and s < t. In our procedure the optimal q for the symmetric state distribution is taken equal to 1/5.
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As mentioned, the values of interest for PXY Z and QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ are, 0.5 < p 6 0.6 and q = 0.2,
respectively. The distribution Q∗(X2, Y2, E) resulting from the local filtering by the honest parties
depends on the parameter p. In order to estimate Eve’s error we follow a similar argument as for
QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ , now adapted to this slightly more complex case. Despite the big amount of symbols on
Eve’s side (see Table 4), the symmetry in the distribution leads to six main classes that are relevant for
the AD analysis (appendix B further clarifies this point). These arguments lead to the following bound
on Eve’s error:
N >
1
2
∑
n1,n2...n6
N !
(2n1)! . . . (2n6)!
(
6
√
δ1 η1
)2n1
. . .
(
6
√
δ5 η5
)2n5
δ2n66 (15)
where
∑6
i=1 2ni = N . Note that as before the terms δiηi with i = 1 . . . 5 take into account those cases
in which Eve has ni symbols that coincide with the public string sent by Alice and ni symbols that
are opposite to those appearing in the public string. The last term, δ6, as before, refers to the sum of
probabilities for which Eve has no information at all (see details in appendix B). In the asymptotic case
we are treating here, Eq. (15) converges to a multinomial distribution, namely:
N > c
(
6
(√
δ1 η1 + . . .
√
δ5 η5
)
+ δ6
)N
(16)
with c being a positive constant. Bob’s error is much easier to compute, getting β = (3λ1 + λ2)(1 −
q)/(16cN ). Putting these two terms together, we have that the AD protocols works whenever:
β
1− β < 6
(√
δ1 η1 + . . .
√
δ5 η5
)
+ δ6 (17)
Figure 3 shows the ratio between the left hand side and the right hand side, Rβ, as a function of the
parameter p. As above, whenever Rβ < 1, the AD protocol succeeds. The point at which Rβ = 1
corresponds to p = 0.513, as already announced.
3 Conclusions
Non-additivity is an ubiquitous phenomenon in Quantum Information Theory due to the presence of
entanglement. In this work, we provide some evidence for the existence of similar effects for secret classical
correlations. Exploiting the analogies between the entanglement and secret-key agreement scenario, we
have shown that two classical distributions from which no secrecy can be extracted by AD protocols can
lead to a positive secret key rate when combined.
The evidence we provide is somehow similar to the conjectured example of activation for bipartite
entangled states. Note however that, in the quantum case, one of the two states is provably bound.
As mentioned several times, it could well happen that one, or even the two probability distributions
considered here are key-distillable. Indeed, there exist examples of bound entangled states from which
one can obtain probability distributions with positive secret-key rate [37]. Note however that all the
known examples of bound entangled states with non-zero privacy are based on the existence of ancillary
systems on the honest parties, known as shields, that prevent Eve from having the purification of the
systems Alice and Bob measure to construct the key. If any of the probability distributions constructed
here were key distillable, they would constitute a novel example of secret correlations from a bound
entangled state that does not fit in the construction of [37].
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Appendix A
This appendix shows the probability distribution obtained by Alice, Bob and Eve after measuring the
symmetric state (7). Being the table very big we try to give here a schematic representation of it which
can be equivalently useful to the reader to follow our arguments. It reads:
00 01 02 10 11 12 20 21 22
00 (1u) + + (2u) ∗ ∗ (2w) ∗ ∗
01 + (1u) + ∗ (2u) ∗ ∗ (2w) ∗
02 + + (1u) ∗ ∗ (2u) ∗ ∗ (2w)
10 (2u) ∗ ∗ (1v) + + (2v) ∗ ∗
11 ∗ (2u) ∗ + (1v) + ∗ (2v) ∗
12 ∗ ∗ (2u) + + (1v) ∗ ∗ (2v)
20 (2w) ∗ ∗ (2v) ∗ ∗ (1w) + +
21 ∗ (2w) ∗ ∗ (2v) ∗ + (1w) +
22 ∗ ∗ (2w) ∗ ∗ (2v) + + (1w)
Table 5: Schematic view of the distribution QX1,Y 1,X2,Y 2,Z˜ . Due to the lack of space, cells have been grouped in terms
of probability distributions and number of elements (symbols) as explained below.
The joint probabilities P (X1 = i, Y1 = k,X2 = j, Y2 = l) between the honest parties are distributed as
follows:
- cells of type (1i), with i = u, v, w are equal to
1−q
72
- cells of type (2i), with i = u, v, w, are equal to
1+7q
144 ;
- cells of type ∗ , are equal to 1−q48 ;
- cells of type + , are equal to 1−q96 ;
Concerning Eve’s side (see caption of Table 1 for more details about how to read the tables):
- cells of type (1i), with i = u, v, w contain three elements. The terms that play a role in her
discrimination are indicated by the same number and subindex letter. For example, consider the
cell X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 0, Y2 = 0. The label 1u is used for this cell (the same one indicates
X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 1, Y2 = 1 and X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 2, Y2 = 2). The three elements here are
the three probability distributions:
P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,00), P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,11), P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,22).
P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,00) refers to the probability that Eve guesses correctly, the remaining two P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,11),
P (0, 0, 0, 0, z¯00,22) refers to the probability she guesses wrongly.
- cells of type (2i), with i = u, v, w, contain six elements;
- cells of type ∗ , contain two elements distributed with probability one half (in this cases, she knows
nothing about A and B symbols) ;
- cells of type + , contains only one term since in this case Eve’s symbol is perfectly correlated with
those of A and B;
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Appendix B
In this second appendix, we clarify why it is enough to consider six classes of distributions in the AD
analysis of section 2.2.2. From Table 4 the following relations hold:
P (E = [zii, z˜ii00]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zii, z˜ii11]|X2Y2 = 11) = δ¯1
P (E = [zii, z˜ii11]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zii, z˜ii00]|X2Y2 = 11) = η¯1
P (E = [zts, z˜st00]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zts, z˜st11]|X2Y2 = 11) = δ¯2
P (E = [zts, z˜st11]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zts, z˜st00]|X2Y2 = 11) = η¯2
P (E = [zts, z˜ts00]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zts, z˜ts11]|X2Y2 = 11) = δ¯3
P (E = [zts, z˜ts11]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zts, z˜ts00]|X2Y2 = 11) = η¯3
P (E = [zst, z˜st00]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zst, z˜st11]|X2Y2 = 11) = δ¯4
P (E = [zst, z˜st11]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zst, z˜st00]|X2Y2 = 11) = η¯4
P (E = [zst, z˜ts00]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zst, z˜ts11]|X2Y2 = 11) = δ¯5
P (E = [zst, z˜ts11]|X2Y2 = 00) = P (E = [zst, z˜ts00]|X2Y2 = 11) = η¯5
and δ¯6 is the sum of all the P (E = [z∗∗, z˜∗∗22]|X2 = Y2). As already stated in the caption of Table 4,
i, s, t = 0, 1, 2 with s 6= t and s < t. In the computation, it is simpler to use Eve’s probabilities
conditioned on the fact that Alice and Bob have made no mistake after AD, so this means that we only
need to consider the terms in the diagonal of Table 4. For this reason the δi, ηi appearing in eq. (15) are
the previous ones but normalized. The complete expression is then derived according to the argument
already presented at page 10.
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